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Presidential Nominations and Regional Primaries:
An Analysis of Proposals for Reform
By: John S. Jackson
Introduction
The 2007‐2008 presidential nominations season will go down in the record books as the
longest, the most expensive, the most frontloaded, the most debated, the most unpredictable and the
most contentious presidential nominations contest in American history. Part of the reason for the scope
and depth of the highly public conflict was the fact that this was the first time since 1952 when a sitting
president or vice president was not a serious contender for the nomination of one of the two major
parties. Thus, it is an open seat contest for both major parties, and both parties have attracted from
eight to ten potential early contenders for the nomination. After several trial balloons and early drop‐
outs by officially announced candidates, the fall of 2007 pre‐primary season produced eight officially
announced candidates for both parties. A lot of contenders meant a lot of traffic, and lot of coming and
going into the early primary and caucus states, like Iowa and New Hampshire, and crowded stages when
both parties held their seemingly innumerable pre‐nomination presidential debates in the 2007 warm
up season. It also meant that the mass media were very active, especially early in trying to handicap the
frontrunners and dark‐horses, and in trying to keep up with all the press releases and political
machinations from all the candidates and their camps. It also meant that the paid media, especially
television, came up in the early contest states much more extensively and earlier than it had in the past.
The campaign was on in full force in the early months of 2007 and as that year wore on the intensity of
the media’s coverage of campaign 2008 increased with each month. By the end of 2007 it seemed like
the race for 2008 had already been underway for a very long time. Many observers were saying that the
campaign season was just too long, a complaint which had been heard in previous races, but perhaps
never heard quite this early.
For comparison, it is worth noting that in 1968, forty years ago and the last year before the rules
reforms transformed the system, Senator Robert Kennedy announced that he was running for president
on March 16th and the incumbent president, Lyndon Johnson, announced that he was dropping out on
March 31st. Vice President Hubert Humphrey immediately announced that he was running to replace
Johnson. Humphrey ultimately became the Democratic Party’s nominee, and he did so without entering
or winning a single primary. That whole system has changed today and is massively “frontloaded” with
more and more states moving their presidential primaries and caucuses to the first two months of the
election year. The major emphasis now is on running in and winning the early primaries and caucuses.
The rule now is, “win early and win often” or be winnowed out inexorably and quickly. The party rules
changes have produced a whole new nominations system where the premium has been placed by the
states on holding their primaries or caucuses as early as possible and with the states involved in intense
competition over who can go first and how the early states can comply with the national party rules. It
has also produced a much larger number of states now holding primaries and approximately three‐
fourths of the national convention delegates are now selected in primaries. The last three decades
have produced a whole new presidential nominations system and one which has become immensely
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more complicated, expensive, and long because of the frontloading of the calendar and the
unpredictability of what strategies the states will adopt with each one jockeying for an advantageous
position and looking out for its own state interests (Jackson and Crotty, 2000; Wayne, 2004; Polsby and
Wildavsky, 2008).
In addition to the rules changing and the primaries taking a much more prominent role, the
federal financing of primaries, which had undergirded the contests since 1976 had kept both parties
within certain fairly narrowly restricted fundraising and spending boundaries under the rules regarding
federal financing and matching funds. This system started to collapse in 2000 when President George
W. Bush decided to forego federal matching funds, and the spending limits they entailed, in his
nominations quest that year. The system collapsed almost entirely, especially for the frontrunners, in
2004 when both George Bush and John Kerry, as well as Howard Dean for the Democrats refused
federal financing. In 2008, all the top tier candidates in both parties refused federal financing, except
for John Edwards, and it was taken as a sign of weakness in his fundraising capacity when he decided to
accept federal funding and their attendant spending caps. As a result, the informal targets for the
Democrats to raise by the end of 2007 became around $100 million which both Senators Hillary Clinton
and Barack Obama were able to meet. The stakes to be competitive for the Republicans were slightly
lower, which is unusual that the Democrats would outspend the Republicans, but the pace was set by
the Republican leaders, Romney and Giuliani, both of whom expected to raise at least $75 million by the
end of 2007. By contrast, Vice President Al Gove only raised and spent approximately $35 million to win
a competitive nominations contest against Senator Bill Bradley in 2000 when both Democratic
candidates operated under the federal financing rules in effect then. So, the price of admission to the
first tier of the high stakes nominations game has tripled in just eight years. The fundraising starts
earlier and the financial targets are much greater now for the competitive candidates.
Perhaps the most unusual and negative feature of the whole pre‐nominations season in 2007‐
2008 was the fact that the calendar was in a state of flux from the beginning, and it took an un‐
precedented length of time for the primaries and caucuses calendar to be settled. The nominations
calendar was also settled later than it had ever been before. This uncertainty also produced very
significant conflict between the national parties and the state legislatures and governors of several
states as well as with their state parties. The two national parties, acting through the Democratic
National Committee and the Republican National Committee, tried to settle the calendars for the states
early in the season. They fixed a window within which most states were required to hold their
presidential primaries or caucuses. That window was set by the national parties to be between February
2 and July 28th. This rule propelled action on the part of a number of states who had originally
scheduled primaries and caucuses in March, or later, to move to Tuesday, February 5th which quickly
became the most popular date. Ultimately twenty two states settled on that date for their presidential
primary or caucus. The Democrats decided, as usual, to let New Hampshire and Iowa go first and earlier
than the window provided for the other states. The Republicans decided that the Iowa caucuses, even
though held outside the window, would not be a violation of the rules since those caucuses do not
technically select the delegates to the national conventions. The Democrats also agreed to let the
Nevada caucuses and the South Carolina primary be held in January as an attempt to get more diversity
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into the early contests. (This decision was at least tacit recognition of the unrepresentative nature of the
populations of Iowa and New Hampshire). Later Florida, Michigan, and the Wyoming Republicans
decided that they, too, should hold their contests in January. This rush to the front by other states
precipitated a deeply divisive fight between the state governments and state parties and both national
party organizations. The Democratic National Committee decided that they had to enforce national
party law with respect to the window and that Florida and Michigan would lose their delegate seats in
the Democratic National Convention in August of 2008 if the states did not hold their primaries within
the prescribed windows. The Republican National Committee took similar steps; however, they directed
that only half of the delegates to their national convention would be withheld from the non‐compliant
states. This was the major sanction the national parties possessed, and it was a mark of how seriously
they took the challenge from the states that they were willing to at least threaten to exercise that
sanction. Although many observers doubted that the party nominees would ultimately back up the
threat when the actual time for the national conventions rolled around the conflict prolonged the time it
took to settle on a final set of calendar dates for all the states involved.
More unsettling still was the constant jockeying for early position engaged in by most states and
the unsettling effects this had on the overall calendar. (See Appendix A for the 2008 calendar.) In many
states either their governors or their state legislatures, or state party officials were determined not to be
left out of the decision making process. They wanted their primary or caucus to be noticed nationally
and to count and they wanted the voters in their states to be heard. Their hotel, motel, rental car
agencies, and television stations also wanted a piece of the significant revenue stream that was flowing
into the early contest states. And why not? Why should the voters in Iowa and New Hampshire have
such an outsized influence on who would be the Democratic and the Republican nominee for President
of the United State? This is the most powerful and important office in the world as we often hear
asserted. Why should two small, predominantly rural and clearly unrepresentative states get to start
the whole process and provide a major boost to the winners and cosign the losers of those contests to
an early exit? The voices of other states, like Michigan and Florida, both of whom are much more
diverse than Iowa or New Hampshire, were raised with increased insistence in the 2007 calendar wars.
In addition, in the current system the mass media largely get to define the rules of the
“expectations game”. That is, they get to decide which candidates have met, exceeded, and failed to
exceed their expectations as to how the candidates were supposed to do in those early contests. Thus,
even a second place finisher, like Clinton in New Hampshire in 1992, McCarthy in New Hampshire in
1968, Pat Robertson in Iowa in 1988, Gary Hart in Iowa in 1984, Jimmy Carter in Iowa in 1976, and
George McGovern in Iowa and New Hampshire in 1972 all were deemed to have exceeded expectations
even though they came in second and did not win the most votes. Nevertheless, they got the lion’s
share of the news coverage and enjoyed at least a temporary “bounce” in the polls which came with the
story line of winning or exceeding expectations in those two early states. The way the current system
operates magnifies the power of the media to define expectations and then determine the winners and
losers. Careful empirical research has demonstrated that the mass media, especially television, lavish
approximately half of their total nominations coverage on the Iowa caucuses and the New Hampshire
primary (Adams, 1988; Wayne, 2004, 121‐123). In addition, the rest of the very early contests garner
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most of the rest of the media’s attention. Media coverage of the early contests is intense leading up to
the early contests; then the question of who will be the nominee of both parties is quickly settled, and
the late deciding states receive no media or candidate attention at all.
All of these forces acting together produced the most frontloaded nominations calendar in
history in 2008. It also produced the earliest dates in history for the first caucus in Iowa and the first
primary in New Hampshire to be held. In fact, the jockeying for position got so bad that there was
serious consideration given to either Iowa or New Hampshire holding their contests in December of
2007. Iowa ultimately settled for January 3, a Thursday, two days after New Year’s Day to hold its
caucuses. This left New Hampshire to try to settle on a date for its primary and that decision was not
announced until November 21, 2007, the day before Thanksgiving . On that date, New Hampshire
Secretary of State, Bill Gardner, who had the sole discretion to decide on the final date, announced that
the date for New Hampshire would be January 8th, only five days after Iowa (Achenbach, 2007, A‐1).
This was the earliest either state had held its opening contests. At that point, the Iowa caucus was only
42 days away, and the New Hampshire primary was only 47 days away. The Michigan primary was set
for January 15th, in defiance of both national parties and that decision was also tied up in court. The
South Carolina Republican Primary and the Nevada caucuses were set for January 19, and the
Democratic primary in South Carolina was set for January 26. The Florida primary for both parties was
scheduled for January 29th. Thus, seven states were set to hold their primaries or caucuses before the
end of January, 2008, the earliest opening salvoes ever in presidential nominations politics.
Frontloading was not a new phenomenon and it had been underway with increasing velocity
since 1988; however, it was taken to the extreme in 2008. What previously had been a steady stream
of states swimming toward the front of the calendar before became a tide by 2007. February 5th was
the earliest Tuesday feasible, without conflict with the national parties over the rules, and it became the
favorite date. By the time the smoke had settled, 22 states had taken action to hold their nominations
contest on that day. Since 1984 similar big days on the nominations calendars had been dubbed “Super‐
Tuesday” by the media. This date, February 5th, loomed so large because the number of states holding
primaries or caucuses that day meant that well over a majority of the delegates would be selected by
that date and the name of both nominees would almost certainly be known by then. Counting the
states with January contests, this meant that over half of the states would have been heard from by the
end of the day on February 5th. February 5th became so big and so important that the media started
searching for adequate superlatives to describe it. Various new labels were suggested including “Mega‐
Tuesday,” “Super‐Duper Tuesday,” and a variety of other new terms were offered to try to distinguish it
from its predecessors. Nevertheless, the schedule as planned through February 5th still left over twenty
states with primaries or caucuses later than that date, and these left behind states were highly unlikely
to have much, if any, impact on who would be the nominee for president for either major party.
In 2007, the scramble to the front and the jockeying for the earliest dates on the calendar
caused enormous uncertainty for all concerned (Pearson, 2007). Since Iowa and New Hampshire
demand to be first, the dates were not fixed until much later than usual, and the machinations with
respect to the interests of Iowa and New Hampshire versus Michigan and Florida, South Carolina and
Nevada and other states quickly got to be quite conflict ridden and contentious. During the Fall of 2007
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the nation waited with interest on a decision from the Secretary of State in New Hampshire, Bill
Gardner, who was vested with sole power and authority to fire the opening gun in the most important
race in the world. Secretary Gardner was widely reported to be keeping his counsel as to when the gun
would be fired. For months the media speculated that it could be January 8th, 2008. Or, depending on
which other state needed to be outflanked, there was speculation that the New Hampshire primary
could have been set as early as Tuesday, December 11, 2007. Secretary Gardner was obligated to follow
New Hampshire state law which provided that the state’s presidential primary must held at least seven
days before any other “similar event” (a term which is undefined). Secretary Gardner was waiting on
the other states, such as Iowa, Michigan and Florida to settle on a date, so he could then make the final
choice for the New Hampshire primary date. Traditionally, there is a provision for eight days between
Iowa and New Hampshire, so Iowa can bask in the sunlight of the national media for a moment. If
Michigan went on January 15, then Iowa could go on Tuesday, January 8th. Iowa finally chose Thursday,
January 3rd for its caucuses so if that were to be the date (Tuesday, January 1st seemed to be out of the
question), then there would be only five days between Thursday, January 3rd, and a New Hampshire
Primary on Tuesday, January 8th, and many speculated that five days would not be enough time to suit
New Hampshire’s desire to be the focus of attention for as long as possible; however, January 8th was
ultimately the date chosen by Secretary Gardner and New Hampshire(Wang, 2007, 5A).
To add further uncertainty to the mix, there was significant national news coverage of the fact
that the Democratic National Committee threatened to withhold the convention delegate credentials
from both Florida and Michigan if they did not follow the national calendar which the DNC adopted
(Ohlemacher, 2007, 6A). The Republican National Committee had the same calendar rule and
threatened to enforce it. Then the RNC decided to withhold only half the national convention delegate
seats from Michigan, Florida, South Carolina, Wyoming, and New Hampshire if they don’t follow the
rules with regard to the window. Even New Hampshire, which had traditionally been given an
exception, was held to this rule since they scheduled their primary so early. (Shear, 2007. “RNC Makes
Punishment Official”). Then there was a “mini drama” played out as to which Democratic candidates
had promised not to campaign in Florida or Michigan during the primary season, but maybe send in
their surrogates under cover of darkness and pretend they were there on other kinds of business. (It
proved to be difficult to not notice a former president being in the state and pretending that he was
actually not there promoting his wife’s candidacy).
Just to try to recount all these Machiavellian machinations shows just how esoteric and
ridiculous the considerations became late in 2007 and early in 2008. It also emphasizes how parochial
the calendar considerations were. That is the point, i.e. the rules are set for all kinds of local and
parochial reasons with little or no regard for any sense of an overarching national interest in the
decisions which are made. What’s good for the motel operators and television stations in Iowa and New
Hampshire may not necessarily be good for the nation. Thus, there is a real need to consider
alternatives which could be put into place well before the game begins again for 2012. If new rules can
be agreed upon by the two national parties then the two national conventions which will meet in August
for the Democrats and in September for the Republicans can act on the new rules for 2012 in relative
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isolation from considerations of the advantages of prospective candidates for 2012. This is especially
the case for the out party, and it will be unclear who the out party will be when the conventions meet.

Prescriptions for Change
The prescriptive section of this paper begins with a set of propositions in favor of change in the
present nominations system. These prescriptions as follow flow from the set of conditions described
above which provided a thumbnail sketch of the 2007‐2008 pre‐nomination and nominations season:
1. The presidential nominations system we have now is not rational. It is chaotic and confused,
and the rules of the game are not agreed upon before the beginning of the game. What’s more,
it has been a mess for many years and it got much worse in the 2007‐2008 cycle.
2. The President and the Vice President of the United States are the only two nationally elected
officials we have. It there has ever existed a national office in the United States, with a national
interest attached, it is the nominations and elections for president.
The current chaotic system is the product of 50 different states, and 100 different state parties
looking after their own interests. In addition, they are looking after the interests of the hotel and motel
owners, the media owners, the rental car agencies, the restaurants and bars who want to attract
attention, and the hordes of reporters and volunteers who show up in the snows of Iowa and New
Hampshire in the dead of winter, to fill up rooms and bar stools which would otherwise be unoccupied.
A study commissioned by the state of New Hampshire found that their presidential primary in 2000
resulted in an infusion of $264 million directly into the state’s economy (Cited in Wayne, 2004, 152).
That figure would certainly be much bigger for 2004 and 2008.
“Momentum, Money and Media” have become the name of the game in this process. The
requirements for the candidates to collect vast sums of money in order to attract the media’s attention
and to buy their advertising, in order to create the sense of momentum have become the insatiable
imperatives of the current system. Usually that means heavy commitment first and foremost to Iowa
and New Hampshire with a side‐long glance in 2008 for Nevada and South Carolina with some additional
strategy for how to handle Florida and Michigan.
It is all well and good for states to have tradition and pride and one can respect New Hampshire
and Iowa’s views on their pride of place. Another point in favor of Iowa and New Hampshire is that they
are both “purple” states, i.e. they are swing states. Iowa went for Gore in 2000 and for Bush in 2004
(narrowly) while New Hampshire went in the opposite direction. It is also true that many who have
campaigned in those two states sing the praises of the voters there. They are serious citizens who seem
to take their civic duty and responsibilities quite seriously. They are reported to ask serious and relevant
questions and to expect answers in kind. Campaigning in Iowa and New Hampshire apparently realizes
what is called “retail politics” at its best. However, it is nothing more than historic accident that these
two states are first. Indeed that pride of place has been attained only fairly recently by both New
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Hampshire and Iowa. New Hampshire claims that their distinction of holding the first in the nation
primary extends all the way back to 1920; however, until the reforms fundamentally changed the
nominations process and elevated the role of the primaries in the period between 1968 and 1972, it
mattered very little which state went first and when the New Hampshire primary was held. In addition,
in the case of Iowa the “first in the nation” tradition only got started in 1972 and it only started receiving
national notice in 1976 when Jimmy Carter ran second to “uncommitted” but received credit for an
upset victory in Iowa which helped to launch his outsider victory in the Democratic contests that year
(Squire, 1988, chapter one). In addition, neither state is remotely representative of the rest of the
United States. Both are more rural, more white, i.e. , they have fewer minorities, and older than the
nation as a whole(Stone, Abramowitz, and Rapoport, 1989). New Hampshire is also better educated and
more prosperous than the national average (U. S. Census Bureau, State and County Quick Facts,
accessed December 3, 2007. Also see: Bain and Elkins, 2007). It may be desirable to find a place where
retail politics can be practiced early in the nominations cycle and some of the proposals reviewed below
achieve that objective; however, it is quite possible to find states that are populated by equally civic
minded citizens while at the same time being much more representative of the nation as a whole. Who
is to say that the citizens of Michigan, Wyoming, and Florida, for example, would not rise to the occasion
if they had the national spotlight and were invited to exercise an outsized impact on who would be the
nominees of the two major parties for the next president of the United States? Indeed, there is
evidence from the 2007 experience that the citizens of South Carolina and Nevada took their new found
responsibilities quite seriously and turned out in force to attend candidate rallies and to listen to the
candidate debates held in their states.
The president of the United States is the most powerful office in the world as we like to say.
Electing the president is the World Series and the Super Bowl of politics. The current system is like us
starting the Super Bowl or the World Series without having any agreed upon set of rules of the game.
We are supposed to work out the rules of the game after the game has already started. To borrow an
analogy from basketball, it is as though we decided to decide after the game had already started what
the rule was about a three point basket and how far away it should be shot and whether it really
counted for three or only two points. That is exactly what we were doing in the warm up to 2008. If
there was ever a “national interest” in American politics, the establishment of a set of commonly agreed
upon and rational set of rules for the selection of the president should be it. Procedurally, it is certainly
possible to devise several more rational alternatives. The question is one of finding the political will to
do it.
The First Amendment’s protection of the right of association gives the national parties a good
deal of power to regulate and overcome state laws according to recent rulings from the Supreme Court
of the United States. The Supreme Court of the United States has clearly agreed that this kind of
decision can be made by the national parties and that their party rules and laws take precedence over
even state laws. This was the thrust of a series of rulings starting with Cousins v. Wigoda (1976)
regarding the seating of the Chicago delegation to the 1972 Democratic national convention and running
down through the Democratic Party of the U. S. v. LaFollette (1981) case out of Wisconsin, regarding the
parties requiring closed primaries and the most recent case overturning the blanket primary, i.e.
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California Democratic Party vs. Jones, (2000). All of those cases give wide latitude to the associational
rights of the parties and those rights would transfer to the right of the national parties to make national
rules for the control of their nominations. It also potentially means the U. S. Congress could regulate,
by passing a federal law, adopting a national set of rules governing presidential nominations and many
experts believe that to be a viable option. For example, U. S. Senators Amy Klobucher, Lamar Alexander,
and Joseph Lieberman, and their staffs have proposed federal legislation, reviewed below, which takes
that position, and they firmly maintain that it is constitutional. Likewise, U. S. Representative Sander
Levin and Senator Bill Nelson have introduced a presidential primary reform bill, and they believe that
federal legislation is in good constitutional order. That proposition regarding the potential for the
congress and the president to address the issue through federal law is more problematic and more
controversial however. Political Scientist, William Mayer of Northeastern University, for example, has a
cogent and forceful argument that this is not a decision which the federal government should make and
that the constitution leaves it up to the states to conduct elections and thus they have the power to
decide when to hold their nominations contests (Mayer, NASS presentation, November 16, 2007).
Mayer’s position does not preclude the national parties taking action on their own authority and
initiative.
The Criteria
What should be the standards or criteria we use to select a set of rules? The following are criteria
developed by the author which he advocates. It also provides a brief rationale for the rules advocated.
1. The rules of the game should be predictable, transparent, and agreed upon in advance.
2. The rules, in so far as possible, should be neutral, i.e. not unfairly advantage or disadvantage any
particular party, candidate, faction, or group who are likely to play. (If the rules can’t be entirely
neutral, the advantages and disadvantages they bestow should at least be randomly
distributed.) Candidates will always act “strategically”, that is try to maximize their own best
interests; however, that should not prevent the rules from seeking to make the rules neutral.
3. The plan should maximize “communities of interest”, i.e. show which candidates will run better
in which different parts of the nation.
4. The plan should not foreclose the outcome prematurely by its timing, i.e. determine the winner
too early in the season in a way which leaves out a substantial part of the rest of the nation, or
major state players and interests.
5. No single state, or small number of states or single region, should have the ability to determine
the outcome acting alone. All voters should have an equal initial opportunity to have an impact
on the outcome and no single voter, or group of voters, should be left out (as is the case now).
6. The results should be as “representative” as possible of all parts of the nation, and all the
interests and people who will vote in the general election.
7. The sequence of state events should have enough space between each event to provide for
rational reflection and discourse on what those results mean for who will be president. The
results of each event should provide time for the people, the candidates and the media to
reflect on the results and make adjustments and seek additional information and debate about
9

the merits of each surviving candidate. There should be time for “buyer’s remorse” to be
accommodated and there should be no “rush to judgment” which cuts off debate prematurely.
There are several plans for altering the way we make presidential nominations which have been
advocated by various scholars and political leaders. A capsule summary of the major plans is offered
below.
Alternative Plans:
1. The National Primary Plan‐ Under this plan all states would hold a primary on the same day to select
the nominees for each party. Public opinion polls have consistently shown this plan to be very popular
with the American people. It is quick and simple and gets it all over with on the same day. In addition, it
fulfills America’s equal protection and “one person, one vote” ideals and aspirations since every voter in
every state initially would have an equal opportunity to have a say in who the parties nominate for
president. However, there are many obstacles and unanswered questions regarding the manner of its
adoption (by the national parties, by federal law, or by constitutional amendment?). Critics also contend
that a national primary system would only lengthen the nominations season and increase the costs.
That may be although it is difficult to see how the national primary plan would make either problem any
worse than it is already under the current system. In addition, it is clear that the national primary would
not allow for the advantages of holding more than one election spread over several weeks or months,
which is termed “sequencing” the primaries. As will be noted below there are some advantages to the
sequencing process. We may be getting close to developing a national primary one state at the time as
the rush to the front accelerates. Some observers are now referring to February 5, 2008 as a “de facto
national primary” since some twenty‐two states are holding their primaries on that date and most
believe that the decision will be made for both parties by that date. So, in that sense, it is a national
primary date, loosely defined.
2. The Regional Primaries Plans:
A. The Regional Presidential Primary & Caucus Act‐ Introduced in the 110th Congress by Senator Amy
Klobuchar of Minnesota as the Chief Sponsor and Senator Lamar Alexander of Tennessee and Senator
Joe Lieberman of Connecticut as the co‐sponsors. There would be random selection of which region to
go first, with four regions total and it would set monthly intervals between the election days. The plan is
fixed for four election cycles and the order of regions rotates after the first year and through the next
three election cycles. This plan would let New Hampshire and Iowa stay first in a special position before
the rotation starts. Senators Klobuchar, Alexander and Lieberman believe that this regional primaries
plan should be established through federal law. (See Appendix B).
B. The Klobuchar, Alexander and Lieberman plan is very similar to the” Rotating Regional Primaries
Plan” advocated by the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS). The NASS plan would also
include preserving the traditional “first in the nation” position for New Hampshire and Iowa. However,
NASS advocates that the national parties should adopt this plan rather than it being adopted by the
Congress through federal legislation. A variation on this theme is called “The Time Zone Primaries”
where the nation would be divided according to time zones rather than regions.
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C. Regional Lottery Plan‐ This is Political Scientist Larry Sabato’s Plan. It provides for four regions with
random selection of which of four regions to go first, with a new selection and new regional order
established every four years. The window for elections would be April through July with one region per
month. The regions would have their order determined in January of the year of the election to shorten
the time period and prevent a candidate “camping out” in the first region. Two small states, randomly
selected, are picked to go first, two weeks ahead of the first regional primary. The plan thus eliminates
the privileged position of New Hampshire and Iowa. Sabato advocates adoption of this plan by
amendment to the U. S. Constitution. (See Appendix C).
3. The Delaware Plan‐ The Bill Brock Committee out of the Republican National Committee
originated this plan in 2000. The states are divided into four groups according to population. Small
states go first, then medium sized states, then larger states and the largest states, in four stages with
one month intervals. George W. Bush and the Texas delegation killed this plan in the Republican
National Convention of 2000 although there is new interest in it in some Republican circles for re‐
consideration for 2012. The RNC advocated adoption of this plan through the rules of the national
parties.
4. The Graduated Random Presidential Primary System or “American Plan”‐ Also known as the
California Plan. It is advocated by Political Scientist Thomas Gangale‐ The plan provides that states are
grouped by the number of Congressional Districts they contain, with small states going first, next larger
states going next, etc. It would require ten rounds total, with contests held every two weeks. Large
states would not necessarily go last since some would be interspersed with some earlier primaries.
“The goal is to allow multiple candidates to compete as long as possible with the winner determined
only at the very end of the voting.”(NASS Press Release, October 30, 2007).
5. The Fair and Representative Presidential Primary System of 2007‐ House Bill 1523 Introduced by
Representative Sander Levin of Michigan and Senator Bill Nelson of Florida. The nation would be
divided into six regions and sub‐regions. A group of states would be randomly selected from each sub‐
region to represent that region in each of the six primary or caucus dates to be spread across the
calendar from the second Tuesday in March through the second Tuesday in June. In short, each of the
election days would have a representative sample of states included in each of the six election days.
(National Association of Secretaries of State, Fact Sheet, October 30, 2007; Levin, Fact Sheet, September
6, 2007; Bain and Elkins, Newsweek, November 12, 2007, 47). (See Appendix D.)
Commentary on the Alternative Plans
In my estimation, there are some benefits and some deficits attached to virtually any of the several
plans offered here. It is especially important to take the uncertainty and lack of transparency out of the
system for the 2012 election cycle. In other words, criteria one and two above would be satisfied by
agreement upon any national set of rules and regulations. Virtually any of these plans if agreed upon
beforehand and adopted by one of the methods that would ensure its survival in the courts, would be
preferable to the chaotic mess which has developed in 2007‐2008. The states, and some of the
dominant economic interests in some of the states, acting alone, and with only their own parochial
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interests and recently acquired traditions in mind, have effectively taken over the nominations process
and left no room for consideration of other states or the national interest in the nomination of the
candidates, one of whom will be the next president of the United States. In my assessment, overall, the
regional primary plans are the most likely to be adopted and they meet a large number of the criteria
which I have specified. The regional primaries are uniquely suited to realizing the objectives of criteria
number three through seven I have specified above. The regional primaries plans would dramatically
increase the representative nature of the primaries and caucuses and allow all sections of the nation to
have a say in who the nominees will be. In my view we have a serious “equal protection” problem in
place now when the voters in two or a few small and unrepresentative states have an enormous impact
on the nominations and the voters in many other states have effectively no say at all. Regional
primaries, and the national primary, would make all voters much more nearly equal and in theory the
candidates would have to campaign seriously in many more states than they do now. The regional
primaries also provide a distinctive role for each geographical region and they still preserve a significant
role for the states within each region. Regions are important and different in American politics, and the
regional primaries plans recognize that reality. These plans also provide a sequencing of the primaries
and caucuses in a way that makes sense and is easily understood by the voters. This allows for a calm
and collected consideration of the early results and for readjustment of strategy and rhetoric by the
surviving candidates coming out of each region. It also allows for “buyer’s remorse” to set in so the
party leaders and political elites can make a more orderly and considered judgment as to whether they
want to go with the winner of the early contests. The national primary would also certainly have the
advantage of being a national plan, and it is easily understood by the voters. However, it may have too
many practical and political obstacles to overcome. If we did not have a run‐off primary, or a second
primary election, it would be impossible to guard against what is known as the “Arrow Paradox”, i.e. the
winner in a multi‐candidate field can actually be the last choice candidate for a majority of the voters if
the winner is only supported by an intense minority. The only way to avoid that problem is to conduct a
runoff primary. The national primary plan also fails to provide for the advantages of sequencing the
primaries and guarding against the need for sober second thoughts among the electorate which the
regional primaries provide. A national primary will undoubtedly be extremely expensive and favor the
well funded candidates especially if we scheduled a runoff primary as well. However, the system we
have in place now also clearly favors the well funded candidates as would any conceivable alternative
which does not entail reestablishing the federal financing plan, and its attendant limits, which came
unglued in 2000 and 2004 because of the actions of a few extraordinarily well financed candidates. In
fact serious consideration and debate about how to re‐establish the federal financing rules and caps for
the nominations process is another change which should be explored.
Obviously, the “system” we have now fails virtually all of the criteria offered above. The most
damming indictment of the system now is that we can’t even agree upon the rules of the game ahead of
time, and that we have such chaos in the manner in which the 2007‐2008 presidential nominations
contests are being conducted (Pearson. 2007. “Confusion Reigns” 1). However, this chaotic situation
did not just happen yesterday. We have known for a long time that the frontloading phenomenon was
accelerating and that something needed to be done. Many groups and individuals have advanced
various proposals for change. For example, the former U. S. Senator from Illinois, Alan Dixon, in 1991
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advanced the idea of holding eight regional primaries spread across the map and across the calendar.
Earlier former Senator Bob Packwood of Oregon and former Senator Walter Mondale of Minnesota each
proposed a variation of the regional primary plan. So, the feeling that the frontloaded system is a real
problem has been around a long time and both parties and numerous thoughtful members of Congress
have struggled with finding a solution. In the meantime the problems have only intensified. Other
experts have advanced other ideas. The National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS) began
advocating a Regional Primaries plan in 2004. The NASS plan is much like and fundamentally compatible
with the Rotating Regional Primaries Plan advanced by Senators Klobuchar, Lieberman, and Alexander.
The NASS had vowed to work toward an alternative plan well in advance of the 2012 presidential
election cycle. Many feel that this effort should have some urgency to it and that there is a real need to
get a plan in place in time for the two national party conventions, to be held in late August of 2008 for
the Democrats and in early September for the Republicans, to ratify a plan which would control the
2012 cycle.
Conclusion
As a people, Americans typically do not act on fundamental change until there is a crisis. In my
view, the United States should now be considered to be in crisis with the mess we’ve created in 2007‐
2008. If this were a banana republic, the U. S. State Department would look down its nose and sniff
about the inadequacy of the system we have. It is time for the United States to act like a mature
democracy and to admit that our nominations procedures can be improved upon and that there is a
compelling national interest in doing something to address the very real shortcomings of the practices
we have now which are the product of nothing larger than the parochial interests of a few states and
their most active and articulate groups. There are many plans which have been advocated which are
worthy of consideration and which should be a part of the national dialogue.
The Regional Primaries are probably a lot more feasible and more likely to be adopted. It is not
too big a jump from where we are now. This plan represents incremental change, and that is usually the
most practical way to get change in American politics. In additional, the Regional Primaries do enhance
some of the values I have articulated. For example, items number one through seven would all be better
served by a Regional Primary than by the current system. A regional primaries plan also leaves the
states as building blocks of the final winning coalition. The time to act is now, at least in 2008 and
preferably in time for the national conventions of both parties to be held in August and September of
2008. The plans adopted then could be made applicable to the 2012 cycle, and they would not clearly
be adopted with the direct interests of any current candidate in mind. After the new rules have been in
place for one election, they will become much more neutral and much more rational than the collection
of state laws and national party rules which determines the sequence and outcomes now. Democracy is
always going to be somewhat messy, but the electoral rules of the game can strive to be as rational,
transparent and neutral as possible. As a nation we should act with those objectives in mind.
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Appendix A
2008 Presidential Primaries and Caucus Calendar
January
3‐ Iowa
5‐ Wyoming (R)
8‐ New Hampshire
15‐ Michigan
19‐ Nevada, South Carolina (R)
26‐ South Carolina (D)
29‐ Florida
February
1‐ Maine
5‐ Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia,
Idaho (D), Illinois, Kansas (D), Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico (D),
New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah
9‐ Louisiana, Kansas (R)
10‐ Maine (D)
12‐ D. C., Maryland, Virginia
19‐ Hawaii (D), Washington, Wisconsin
March
4‐ Ohio, Rhode island, Texas, Vermont
8‐ Wyoming (D)
11‐ Mississippi
April

22‐ Pennsylvania
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May
6‐ Indiana, North Carolina
13‐ Nebraska, West Virginia
20‐ Kentucky, Oregon
27‐ Idaho (R)
June
2‐

Montana, New Mexico (R), South Dakota

August
25‐28‐ Democratic National Convention in Denver, Colorado
September
1‐4‐ Republican National Convention in Minneapolis‐St. Paul, Minnesota
Source: Based on National Association of Secretaries of State Calendar, November 29, 2007.
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Appendix B

Regional Presidential Primary and Caucus Act (The Klobuchar Plan)
Source: Bain and Elkins, 2007 and National Association of Secretaries of State

Appendix C

Regional Lottery Plan (The Sabato Plan)

Source: Bain and Elkins and National Association of Secretaries of State

